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Kanchana N Ruwanpura, Benjamin Brown and Loritta Chan 
Institute of Geography, University of Edinburgh, Drummond Street, Edinburgh EH8 9XP 
9 
Abstract 
Sri Lanka is in the midst of a post-war infrastructure boom, with new investment directed 
into roads, ports and airports as part of an uneven and contested development process. 
Taking the transformations unfolding in Colombo as our point of departure, we examine 
how the vision of Megapolis has animated debates on the geographies of connectivity. 
The post-war Sri Lankan political landscape initially envisioned political integration, 
which was to be delivered through the expansion of national road networks.  The political 
priorities in the past decade reoriented away from integrating the nation to the strategic 
positioning of Colombo as a financial trading hub for South Asia. Focusing on Colombo’s 
flagship Port City project, we problematise these models of development by 
foregrounding counter-narratives that speak to concerns around debt, enclosure, 
persistent ethnic tensions, and the degradation of coastal ecosystems.  
Keywords: Sri Lanka, infrastructure, uneven development, connectivity, ecological stress 
 
‘The design suggested a kind of complacency that was itself a kind of madness… It was as 
if the bourgeois belief in the regularity of the world had been carried out to the point of 
derangement.’ 




‘If man creates an illusory world, these illusions will come to haunt him.’ 
- Bishop Asiri Perera, Methodist Church of Sri Lanka (public speech, July 2018) 
 
Introduction: Sri Lanka in motion  
When Bishop Asiri Perera stood up to address members of the Peoples’ Movement 
against Port City (PMAPC), a collection of fishing communities, religious leaders, 
environmentalists, trade unionists and urban activists, gathered along Colombo’s Galle 
Face Green, he tapped into a widely-held sense of trepidation amid the rapid 
transformations unfolding in Sri Lanka. Against a backdrop of cranes and scaffolding 
towering over the seafront, his speech cautioned against the ultimate fallibility of human 
designs. Perera’s intervention echoed concerns voiced by Amitav Ghosh (2017), who in 
The Great Derangement sought to identify exactly why the threat of climate change has 
elicited such a muted global response and lack of critical introspection. For Ghosh, this 
represents an imaginative failure, a consequence of submission to the nihilism of 
economic growth, and a retreat to the enduring civilizational myths of progress, which 
continues to animate the workings of contemporary capitalism. Indeed, both men were 
speaking to the construction boom gripping many parts of the world - including post-war 
Sri Lanka - and a development founded on an ‘economy of appearances’ (Tsing 2011). 
The symmetry in their words, so heretical to the minds of developers, investors, and the 
nation’s political class, vividly illustrated the paradoxical impulses at the core of Sri 
Lanka’s uneven and contested development process – as the unanticipated political 
volatility and Easter day bombings signal.  
Since the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war in 2009, successive governments’ ambition 
to transfigure Colombo into a hyper-modern megapolis have grown exponentially. Under 
3 
 
the auspices of the newly formed, Ministry of Megapolis and Western Development, the 
country has witnessed an influx of investment, funnelling money into an array of real-
estate and infrastructure projects. However, the absence of meaningful democratic 
deliberation or citizen input addressing how this much vaunted development might 
reshape Colombo’s urban ecosystem and direction of development has been met with 
alarm. The crowd addressed by Bishop Perera had assembled to resist this new ‘offshore’ 
urban development under construction, and the latest example of a pivot towards a debt-
fuelled and overtly financialised economic model (Gidwani and Baviskar 2011; 
Kadirgamar 2013; Nagaraj 2016). Despite protestations around debt, enclosure and the 
degradations of coastal ecosystems, Port City has become a flagship initiative, with multi-
party backing from both the current UNP coalition government and their political 
predecessors, the latest stage of a post-war development vision geared towards 
reinventing Colombo as a ‘world class’ hub for trade, tourism and finance (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Nationally, post-war infrastructure priorities have shifted from roads to ports; 
new infrastructure and real-estate projects and ports, including the controversial 
Hambantota Port and Colombo Port City, have dominated public debate. In the ambition 
to become a globally connected trading nation, the construction of Port City is viewed as 
an economic imperative.1 The theme of connectivity has been a refrain increasingly 
mobilised in political discourse; former president Mahinda Rajapaksa made it a key 
                                                 
1 The recent Easter bombings (April 21st 2019) in various parts of Sri Lanka, including Colombo, may 
however bring other complexities to the time-line and the nature of the project, as China on the next day 
(April 22nd 2019) was the first country to have issued a travel advisory to its citizens to leave Sri Lanka 
because of security concerns. BRI (Belt & Road Initiative) geopolitics may have shifted on the day, with 
likely realignment and Sri Lanka’s role within it needing further scrutiny. 
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theme of his flagship Mahinda Chinthana policy vision, a frame since invigorated by the 
present government’s recommitment to the ‘business for peace’ agenda (Venugopal 
2018; Brown, Chan and Ruwanpura 2018). Since the defeat of the LTTE militants in 2009, 
successive governments have sought to consolidate popular support and territorial 
control through roadbuilding and infrastructure programmes, incorporating the former 
warzones of the North and East back into national life (Sarvananthan 2011). Although, 
the stated focus of infrastructure was initially to integrate the nation and mend a 
fractured ethnic polity, over time there has been marked shift in emphasis, in keeping 
with efforts to strengthen regional economic and political ties across Asia in alignment 
with China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative (de Alwis 2010; Duar, 2010, 2015; 
Mawdsley 2012; Sidaway and Woon 2017).  
Situating our research at a critical juncture in Sri Lanka’s post-war history, in this 
paper we seek to disentangle the ways in which policy-makers and related institutions 
respond to realities that might hinder development ambitions. In a moment where a 
revived economic developmental logic is taking hold, following trends towards neoliberal 
urbanism and global connectivity (Doshi 2018; Nagaraj 2016), we draw attention to the 
simultaneous disconnect from local inhabitants and their articulation of livelihood claims 
to secure environmental justice, the politics of debt and ethnicity, and the disruption to 
marine ecology, which is rendered subordinate to the growth imperative (see also Sanyal 
2007; Gidwani and Baviskar 2011). The next section of our paper unpacks how 
geographies of connectivity speak to Sri Lanka’s post-war development ambitions, 
animated by its renewed geopolitical importance as a strategic node on China’s proposed 
Maritime Silk Road under the OBOR initiative. We hope to shed light on discourses on 
connectivity in the context of post-war development, and how the generative effects of 
infrastructure, in particular, invite further scrutiny. The third section of the paper 
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overviews our fieldwork methods and the research conducted in Sri Lanka more broadly 
and Colombo in particular. Our fieldwork contributes to our three substantive sections, 
where we analyse our findings from the viewpoint of those connected and disconnected 
– and consequently bear the ecological stresses induced by “overdevelopment”. We 
conclude our analysis by reflecting on how Sri Lanka’s development trajectory can be 
situated within broader global transformations. Ultimately, we contend that the 
discursive construction of ‘connectivity’ as an animating frame in Sri Lanka’s post-war 
development, for all its claims, simultaneously disavows the ways in which Sri Lankan 
citizens are disconnected from the very aspirations that its political class and economic 
elite champion for a post-war nation.  
 
Connective infrastructures: A catalyst for development? 
This article builds on existing scholarship concerning connectivity, infrastructure, 
and processes of uneven development at this current historical juncture. The desire of 
national governments to develop infrastructure and secure greater connectivity has been 
well established, often embraced as a signifier of modernity, development and progress 
(Appel et al 2015; Enns 2018; Wade 2018). This impulse has been bolstered by 
prominent writers espousing broadly neoliberal policy positions. Parag Khanna’s (2016) 
work on ‘connectography’ has proven influential among a transnational class of business 
and political elites with its optimistic take on the rise of global transportations, 
communications, and energy infrastructures.2 Nation-state are to be rendered obsolete, 
with cities celebrated as key nodes between ‘connective corridors’, coupled with an 
                                                 
2 We particularly draw attention to Khanna’s (2016) work because both at public events and during our 
interviews many advocates and policy makers explicitly mentioned his work; or implicitly did so by 
invoking the trope of connectivity. 
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appeal for greater investment in roads, ports, and related infrastructures to deliver the 
purported benefits of a ‘supply chain world’, the new ‘anchor of global civilisation’ 
(Khanna 2016, 28).  
Critical scholars have drawn attention to the discursive construction of problems 
to be ‘solved’ by technocratic interventions (Scott 1998; Smith 2010; Truelove 2011; 
Doshi 2018), where roads, ports, and infrastructure purport to facilitate rapid progress 
(Anand 2006; Rodgers and O’Neill 2012). In the quest to sustain a regime of 
accumulation, states and corporate entities harness the needs and desires of citizens 
towards the goal of opening new markets.  Yet the group differentiated and targeted 
nature of such interventions, geared towards servicing the needs of global capital, 
forecloses a holistic understanding of entanglements within the nature-society-politics 
nexus. 
The emphasis on connectivity to generate economic growth reflects an abiding 
preoccupation of Sri Lanka’s political class, making post-war Sri Lanka ‘fit’ with the edicts 
of capitalism; its most recent iteration has prioritised delivering a low tax, deregulatory 
regime, with preferential policies to attract foreign investors and facilitate ‘free markets’ 
(Widger 2017; Venugopal 2018).  The growing emphasis on world class cities is 
emblematic of this economic restructuring towards greater global integration, allowing 
countries in the global South to gain international recognition, not only as spaces of 
transit or zones of production, but as a destination  and enclave spaces (Anand 2006; 
Sidaway 2007; Da Costa and McMichael 2007; Baviskar 2011). However, as Enns (2018) 
has demonstrated in East Africa, where development corridors are mobilised for the 
purposes of expanding trade in resources the operationalisation of this infrastructure 
bring new forms of immobility, violence, and spatial exclusion (see also Anand 2006; 
Truelove 2011; Rodgers and O’Neill 2012; Wade 2018). From nearly two decades ago, 
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Graham & Marvin (2001:11) observed that "the construction of spaces of mobility and 
flow for some, however, always involves the construction of barriers for others".  This 
salutary observation, however, continues to be neglected and proceeds regardless of its 
meaning for marginal and disconnected communities (Anand 2006; Da Costa and 
McMichael 2004; Gidwani and Baviskar 2011; Truelove 2011; Wade 2018).  
Infrastructure has received growing attention because of its function as a 
technology of government, and the ways in which this relates to citizenship rights as state 
subjects practice both compliance and resistance in order to secure or legitimate access 
(Anand 2006; Truelove 2011; Appel et al 2015; Wade 2018). In Colombo, the drive to 
reinvent its post-war identity began with urban beautification projects that did nothing 
to tackle urban segregation or other deep-rooted socio-economic inequalities 
(Amarasuriya and Spencer 2015; Caron 2016; Nagaraj 2016). They outline how in the 
desire for post-war Sri Lanka to become connected and networked to finance, trade and 
tourist flows, the colonial concern with ‘improvement’ was mobilised to legitimise the 
eviction and displacement of the working poor and ethnic minorities to the urban fringes. 
This altogether unravels a process of "splintering urbanism" (Graham & Marvin 2001), 
where the physical fabric of the city is fragmented into cellular enclaves of different social 
and economic natures, creating a city lacking internal coherence and where social 
divisions and spatial segregation are continually perpetuated.  
There have been several important contributions highlighting the ethnic and 
social impact of displacement resulting from the construction boom in post-war Colombo, 
addressing persistent marginality and resurgent Sinhala nationalism in the face of new 
luxury developments (Amarasuriya and Spencer 2015; Caron 2016; Nagaraj 2016; Jazeel 
2017). The sense of marvel and wonder generated by the phenomenon of ‘spectacular 
urbanism’, plastered onto billboards that line the construction site, conjured by the 
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project’s promotional materials seek to capitalise on the future hopes, desires and 
aspirations of citizens (Sanyal 2007; Smith 2010; Tsing 2011; Wade 2018). These 
analyses, however, overlook the ways in which capitalism manifests itself as an ecological 
regime, reorganising the environment and space according to the logics of capitalist 
accumulation (Smith 2010; Gidwani and Baviskar 2011). In other words, by centring 
infrastructure, we aim to investigate that even though “built network….facilitate the flow 
of goods, people, or ideas and allow for their exchange over space” (Larkin 2013, 326, our 
emphasis), we also need to consider how the creation of material infrastructures is 
coupled with a denial, disavowal or downplaying of the ecological ruptures and social 
inequities frequently induced. For Sri Lanka our concern is with how the environmental 
impacts, including in the interior of the country, has also been ignored. 
Infrastructure developments also feed into rising tensions between India and 
China over influence in the South Asian region, where Sri Lanka’s strong relationship with 
China has attracted growing interest (de Alwis 2010; Sidaway and Woon 2017, Mawdsley 
2012). Under China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, a broad strategy to develop 
trade routes throughout Asia and reorder the region’s economic geography, Sri Lanka is 
considered as a strategically important location, and a key node on the maritime Silk Road 
envisaged through the Indian Ocean (Lin et al 2018). Prasenjit Duara (2010) has sought 
to explain how different actors negotiate this emerging regional order, proposing that 
nation-states seek to adapt to globalised financial capitalism through flexible citizenship 
and self-improvement projects. As China and India jostle for influence in the South Asian 
region, we reorient our focus to how and what this means for locals disconnected from 
narratives of ethnic and social cohesion through global connectivity and instead feel the 
burden of growing Sri Lanka’s indebtedness – to Western creditors and China, alike (see 




Approach and field methods  
Our article draws on two phases of fieldwork in Colombo (2016-2018) and sits 
within a two-year extended research period in post-war Sri Lanka – which included stints 
in Colombo, Jaffna and Colombo again, mirroring the shifting focus of Sri Lankan 
policymakers.  When the fieldwork initially began in 2016, the newly elected government 
of Maithripala Sirisena had suspended the Port City project, responding to concerns 
around its ecological impact; the political energy at the inception was about both the 
nation and the city.  By early 2018 however, Port City had become the flag bearer of Sri 
Lanka’s quest to be even more integrated into the global economy in an epoch 
increasingly defined as the age of Asia. During these two time periods, we undertook 
interviews with figures selected from academia, business and industry, civil society, and 
the state, and their contributions constituted a core part of our research agenda. 
Respondents were identified using a combination of purposive and snowball sampling, 
with efforts made to include a diverse range of voices and viewpoints. This was 
supplemented with visits to conferences and events, alongside a survey of blogs, 
newspaper articles, reports, and key policy documents, generating a wide range of 
materials for discourse analysis (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
List of sources 
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Close scrutiny of policy documents was illuminating, revealing the discursive 
tensions and contradictory impulses manifested in large-scale development agendas. As 
a team of three researchers we came together in the November-December 2017 period 
to bring this research to conclusion because of failures akin to those identified by 
Harrowell, Davies and Disney (2018).  The fieldwork for the entire project started in the 
summer of 2016 by the lead author and another junior researcher but by Autumn of 2017 
the data gathering was incomplete and wanting.  Hence, to bring this research to 
completion, the new research team worked as follows: two of us conducted an intense 
and short fieldwork phase doing interviews and revisits in Sri Lanka during July 2018 
while the other analysed policy documents and newspaper archives over a six-month 
period.   
Given the resurfacing of Colombo Port City into the post-war development 
landscape and the reorientation away from the nation to the city, we felt it was important 
to capture this moment of Sri Lanka’s volatile post-war development vision. While the 
initial phase of fieldwork started with interviews of those involved in the reimagination 
11 
 
of Colombo as a megapolis, the Port City was suspended, given the dubious 
environmental impacts assessments (Environmental Foundation 2015).  However, even 
at that stage, many policy makers interviewed mentioned to the lead author that the 
break clauses are punitive to Sri Lanka – and they feared the Port City initiative would 
still go ahead.  One and half years later, their fears have since transpired – and we felt it 
was critical to record the conflicting stakes.  As one of us is native to Colombo and Sri 
Lanka, reaching out to relevant informants was done through a web of connections. Our 
interviews were mostly conducted in English, while a few done in one of the vernacular 
languages – in which one of the authors, as a bilingual speaker, is fluent.  
 
We also recognised the politically charged and evolving nature of our subject matter; 
hence we adopted an open-ended and flexible approach by also attending choreographed 
corporate events. These ‘theatres of virtue’ are indicative of a closed culture, reluctant to 
respond to criticism outside of an audience and select to validate its own message (Rajak 
2011); hence, they can be instructive in presenting hegemonic positions. In order to 
anchor our theoretical analysis, it is to these narratives we now turn.  
 
(Dis)connected Colombo: A Cautionary Tale 
The post-war infrastructure boom was visible across Sri Lanka, which began with 
a network of roads and highways criss-crossing different parts of the island.  The 
connectivity initially aspired to rebuild an ethnically polarized nation has within a decade 
shifted to geopolitical connectivity and alignments, with Sri Lanka’s infrastructure 
impetus shifting from roads to ports (Duara 2015; Lin et al 2018; Brown et al 2018).  Port 
City has been at the epicentre of the controversial drive for new development, with the 
aim of cementing Colombo’s place on the map as a 'city of capital' (Nagaraj, 2016); a 
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hyper-modern, globally connected tourism and trading hub for the South Asian region. It 
is in this context that the expansive vision of the Megapolis comes to life, animated by a 
mission to smooth the flow and circulation of people, goods and trade. Connectivity has 
constituted a core tenet of Sri Lanka’s post-war political agenda, affirmed by both the 
Rajapaksa regime and its UNP successors’ commitments to invest heavily in 
infrastructure. Following activities by the Ministry of Defence and the Urban 
Development Authority (UDA) in the immediate post-war years, in 2015 the Ministry of 
Megapolis and Western Development was created and tasked with designing as blueprint 
for transforming the region, addressing critical urban challenges relating to sanitation, 
transportation, and waste (see Figure 2).   
 
Figures 2 and 3 here 
 
The centrepiece of the Megapolis masterplan is the flagship Port City 
development, whose scale – encompassing a 269 hectare expanse of land reclaimed from 
the Indian Ocean - is set to double Colombo’s current population of 750,000 inhabitants, 
inscribing a new benchmark for mega-development projects in the country (see Figure 3 
above). Emulating affluent cities, such as Dubai, Hong Kong, and Singapore, architects of 
Port City seek to develop a new zone adjacent to the Port for commercial and touristic 
activities, building on Sri Lanka’s strategic location close to shipping lanes across the 
Indian Ocean (Lin et al. 2018). The glossy, beguiling renderings of Port City, on display in 
advertising billboards, press releases, and promotional videos, foster an air of 
anticipation by tapping into aspirations and hope (Anand 2006; Da Costa and McMichael 
2007; Tsing 2011). As Harvey and Knox (2012, 534) observe, ‘Infrastructures can dazzle 
with the possibilities they hold – the glitter of progress, the lure of profit, the promise of 
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circulation, movement and a better life as rational and scientific plans…generate illusory 
effects supported by numbers, figures and pictures.’ Following in the footsteps of other 
Asian cities, the Megapolis project presents a seductive promise to deliver economic 
renewal and reimagine a hyper-modern Colombo in keeping with the convictions and 
assurances of global consultancies, investors, and transnational corporations (Anand 
2006; Da Costa and McMichael 2007).  
Delivered at an estimated cost of $15 billion over a 25-year period and bankrolled 
by China, Port City is also designed to host high-end flats, a luxury marina, parks and 
casinos. The prevailing emphasis on ‘high net worth individuals’, creating a low tax zone 
with its own separate legal system, and a thriving centre for ‘offshore products and 
services,’ implies the project is designed to cater to elite and upper-middle class groups. 
Such attitudes were on display at a recent conference entitled ‘Towards the Main 
Financial Hub of Asia: Port City Colombo 2018’, hailing Port City as the spur to transform 
Sri Lanka into an economic power. Later, a banker we interviewed alluded to this 
‘untapped’ potential: 
 
Look at Dubai, CFC, Central Finance, then Singapore. Marina Bay Sands. So many 
others. Look at them. Nothing, like it has never been closed down, or anything like 
it has not taken off. In our sort of geography, there is nothing to cater to India, the 
Southeast, I mean the South Asian market. 
 
There is a performative aspect to the ‘hyper-planning’ of megaprojects like Port City, 
mobilising iconic imagery to animate a ‘city that works’, juxtaposed against the everyday 
frustrations of urban life (Wade 2018, 11; see also Gidwani and Baviskar 2011). In the 
dramatic words of Champika Ranawaka, Sri Lanka’s Minister of Megapolis and Western 
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Development, at a conference address shortly after assuming his new post (2016): ‘we 
have to compete with other nations to attract investment and we have to boost our 
economy…either we peddle and be competitive, or we meddle – collapse and perish.’  
Designs for Port City follow a recurrent emphasis in the Megapolis masterplan on 
improving Colombo’s urban environment, where beautification schemes have already 
transformed some neighbourhoods through the incorporation of trees and foliage, the 
removal of urban detritus and the addition of public amenities. However, their reach has 
been confined to the centre, catering primarily to the city’s middle and upper classes, and 
precipitated the expulsion of street vendors and residents of informal settlements (see 
also Amarasuriya and Spencer 2015; Nagaraj 2016; Jazeel 2017). As Sri Lankan architect 
Madhura Premathilake comments in Colomboscope (2015), ‘a lot of this was done for the 
glorification of the [Rajapaksa] regime; urban design was used as spectacle and 
intoxicant.’ Such admissions speak to the multiple agendas which coexist simultaneously, 
and the contradictory outcomes that this necessarily entails. In cities aspiring to ‘world 
class’ status, settlements and livelihood activities are sanctioned as a legitimate only if 
they align with the aesthetic sensibilities of financial capitalist modernity (Graham & 
Marvin 2001; Anand 2006). 
 From the outset, the Port City concept has been carefully choreographed, 
proceeding as planned despite a brief period of suspension in response to public anger 
over corruption and objections from environmentalists. The sentiment reflects a 
prevailing mood among politicians and policymakers enthralled at the perceived 
successes of Dubai, Hong Kong, and Singapore – while neglecting the failures of similar 
initiatives.3 The message of optimism is communicated through the media, albeit re-
                                                 
3 Our thank to colleagues at Koç and Bogaziçi Universities (Istanbul, Turkey), who offered us many counter 
illustrations from the MENA region, which because of word space limitations we do not go into (see also 
Scott, 1998 for evidence from other parts of the world). 
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articulated through the prism of national self-determination. As one urban activist 
sardonically put it: ‘The Prime Minister says, by 2050, we will be like America and 
Singapore. No one will be indebted. By that time…all that the foreigners have taken from 
us, we will have taken back.’ In gesturing towards the rhetoric of strident nationalism that 
has manifested in Sri Lanka, at times laced with xenophobia, there was tacit recognition 
of the overlap between different political agendas at play. Whilst applauding Singapore 
as a model, respondents nevertheless stressed the distinctiveness of Sri Lanka with its 
own particularities.   
Among the various planners, investors and bureaucrats involved with Port City, 
some expressed doubts, narrating a cautionary tale regarding its development prospects. 
According to one respondent, a property developer who had been approached by Port 
City officials looking to solicit investment, the decision to render a new city from 
reclamation was taken despite ample land available for redevelopment across Colombo. 
Echoing the comments of NGOs, he mentioned how brownfield sites were overlooked and 
disregarded in favour of the portside location. Similarly, a senior administrator from the 
Megapolis planning department privately conceded: 
 
I am not an expert in that environmental sense. But I think it is a political decision 
to reclaim the sea. Especially…places next to the Colombo Port, because you can 
find many other places. I’m not talking as an officer, but as a layperson; around Sri 
Lanka you can find many other suitable places to reclaim….  
 
A more candid explanation was provided by a senior waste contractor who, while broadly 
supportive of the project, expressed doubts about the decision-making logic of the 
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process and once again, alluded to the power of the Chinese state in shaping development 
outcomes:  
 
Port City’s justification is that because it has [already] been signed with the 
Chinese…it has to go ahead. Other than that, there is no other justification. It’s not 
like we need that additional land, there is plenty of land to build on in Colombo. 
You might not be able to build the kind of city that they are envisioning building 
over there. But there is certainly plenty of land to develop. And even if you go 
around the Central Business District, there are so many old buildings, and pretty 
stately buildings, that are not utilised, under-utilised, owned by the state, 
completely neglected buildings that can be completely revived, you know?  
  
As such comments illustrate, the enthused, polished and celebratory tone of official 
proclamations belie the uncertainties, political calculations, and antagonistic relations 
that have blighted the project. Sri Lanka remains riven with social and ethnic fractures, 
and many areas of contention have not yet been resolved (de Alwis 2010; Brown, Kajotha, 
Chan and Ruwanpura 2019; Venugopal 2018). While PM Ranil Wickramasinghe 
announced a suspension of the project in 2015, on the grounds that it would “end up 
destroying the coastal belt from Negombo to Beruwala,” (quoted in the Daily Mirror, 
December 2014), after objections from the Chinese Harbour Engineering Corporation 
(CHEC), construction resumed in 2018.  
 
The People’s Movement against Port City 
The Megapolis masterplan includes many provisions welcomed by advocates for 
a more socially just, liveable city, including improved access to green spaces and plans for 
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a new light rail system in Colombo to ease chronic congestion. Yet since it was first 
publicly mooted in 2011, the plan for Port City has proven exceedingly contentious, with 
a vocal and active social movement rising to resist and warn against its detrimental 
effects. PMAPC have engaged in street protests, litigation, and hunger strikes to express 
the strength of their opposition; mobilising the rhetoric of ‘endangerment’, to  draw 
attention to the prospect of irreversible loss to ecosystems, harm to livelihoods and 
ecological ruination arising from the construction of the Port City (Huggan and Klasen 
2005; Paprocki 2018; see also Gidwani and Baviskar 2011).  
Although Sri Lanka’s 2010 National Physical Plan boasts a series of seemingly 
robust sustainability guidelines, including precautionary principles, intergenerational 
equity and conservation of biodiversity, these do not appear to have been adopted 
wholesale by planners and developers in practice. Bolstered by warnings from geologists 
and marine ecologists, activists have concentrated on resisting dredging and sand mining, 
which bear a direct impact on the livelihoods and declining catch of upstream fishing 
communities due to damaging areas of coral reef and excavating from the seabed. 
Although an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) gave the greenlight to construction, 
this was widely criticised as flawed by opposition politicians at the time and remains at 
the core of grievances. Our research highlights the need for greater engagement with 
dynamic coastal ecology because in spite of reassurances and compensation 
arrangements, livelihoods have nevertheless been adversely impacted by dredging in the 
coastal ecology. Similar concerns have been voiced about the effects of rock mining in the 
interior of the country with effects on the water table.  
Another concern is around procedural justice, particularly regarding the EIA 
released in 2011, which was widely condemned as flawed and inadequate. One Colombo-




‘There was really very inadequate communication about the decision to go 
forward with Port City, and communication across the board has been a huge issue 
with this government. Tremendous failure on all accounts…people are still 
wondering, why…It’s not so hard to communicate if this contract was so tight - in 
terms of transparency it’s not so difficult - but they didn’t...”  
 
Similarly, and with a tinge of irony, a property developer noted that the consultation 
started after the project had begun and not before-hand; if due process had been 
followed, he said that the outcome may have been different given the extent of brownfield 
sites in Colombo.  A respondent from the Colombo Municipal Council stressed that there 
were well established procedures in place for such a project, with social and 
environmental auditing in place to handle any grievances: 
 
‘And under this Megapolis project, I am aware that they have employed a lot of 
social officers. And they are supposed to go and talk to the people who are going 
to be affected. If their land is going to be acquired, or they are going to be shifted, 
or they are going to be put into a flat or something, they are supposed to go before 
decisions are taken to talk to them and ask them and get their views. And then 
they have a discussion.’ 
 
Neoliberal modes of governance conscript citizens into a practice of consultation, whilst 
circumscribing the terms of debate in ways which elide deeper modes of deliberative 
democratic participation (da Costa and McMichael 2007; Baviskar 2011; Truelove 2018; 
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Doshi 2018). Yet, some environmental activists cast doubt on this process of rubber 
stamping, as the director of a leading environmental NGO in Sri Lanka highlighted: 
 
We filed … legal action, because all this started in 2011/12. At that time, we 
opposed; so at that time the Chinese premier came round maybe 2013, while were 
are in dialogue with the Central Environment Authority, and then someone from 
the central government said, please issue no objection letter because we want to 
pump sea sand in front of the Chinese premier. So that’s how they got the no 
objection letter.’  
 
In a country still living in the shadow of violent ethnic past, underscored by the 
spate of bombings on Easter Sunday 2019, public life remains marred by residual ethnic 
tensions, the demonization of minorities, and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.  The 
persistence of majoritarian, communalist politics ensures that minority groups still 
struggle to get their voices heard, and voting constituencies tend to fragment in favour of 
communalist impulses (Caron 2016; Venugopal 2018; Brown et al. 2019).  Equally, 
China’s pivotal role at the end phase of Sri Lanka’s bloodied ethnic war also meant that 
the initial conception of Port City escaped attention and scrutiny needed.  
The organisational base of PMAPC are predominantly Catholic fishing 
communities, residing in the Negombo area, north of Colombo (see Figure 4).  The 
Catholic Church has therefore played a prominent and sometimes controversial role, both 
supporting resistance and acting as a mediator. However, according to one priest who 
has taken an active organisational role in the movement, this involvement had initially 
come in response to pressure from communities themselves: ‘it is they who introduced 
the subject to me. They said that because of this Port City, their livelihoods are affected.’ 
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The role of the Catholic Church has split opinion and divided more radical and moderate 
opponents – between those concerned with the encroachment of mining and dredging 
onto their own livelihood territories, and those objecting at a more fundamental level to 
the underlying logics and political interests driving the project forward without 
democratic legitimacy.4  One fisherman active in the All Ceylon Fisherfolk Trade Union 
decried double standards, pointing out that while the CHEC was permitted to engage in 
sand mining, individual citizens could be fined or face a prison sentence for removing 
corals or taking sand from the beach.  
 
Figure 4 here 
 
 The incipient demands for a rethinking of Colombo’s regional development 
strategy subordinate citizens' movements to broader corporate agendas and political 
dynamics set in motion.  Despite the PMAPC’s limited successes in garnering a revised 
EIA process and promises to remove dredging from fishing Zones in Negombo, it has not 
evolved into a mass movement. There have been various explanations, such as media bias 
limiting the platforms available for critical views, and a stretched capacity amongst 
organisers. The CHEC emerged as a principle target of animosity, with accusations that it 
had corrupted the planning process. Other pointed to the ‘betrayal’ of the Catholic Church 
following a series of donations to divide opposition: 
 
"The parent company of the Chinese Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) has 
given a lot of money to the church...and a lot of money to the fisheries 
                                                 
4 The Catholic Church has also played an instrumental and radical role at various moments in time in Sri 
Lanka’s troubled political history, including on protesting around environmental destructive projects (see 
also Caron and Da Costa, 2007).  
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organisations in the area, so that completely disrupted the campaign at the 
moment. So now they are trying to rebuild the campaign, but we don’t have that 
particular strength at the moment." 
 
Social activists expressed disillusionment with the press to safeguard the public interest 
and hold power to account. In the face of glaring economic inequalities, differing access 
to resources and concentrated forms of political power, the disbursal of payments 
effectively divided and neutralised opposition, as a trade unionist from the National 
Fishers Solidarity Organization (NAFSO) mentioned:   
 
The media was bribed, totally bribed. Because when we put in the first campaign 
we had good media coverage, but later on CHEC… they offered to all the media 
institutions, advertisement…If the Chinese money is floating around, you will get 
it!" 
 
The malleable and situated nature of corruption and how it finds itself attached a variety 
of political projects was underlined by our respondents in either subtle or stark ways (see 
also Rajasingham-Senanayake 2018). Like them, we too found how it offered a normative 
framework through which to attribute moral judgements upon deviations from socially 
accepted norms, drawing on symbolic, material and territorial power where production 
of marginality and class segregation gets re-inscribed (see Smith 2010; Baviskar 2011; 
Nagaraj 2016). 
 Women also spoke of how fishermen had taken money and so been politically 
manipulated. One Catholic nun commented, "Families broke, women were for the cause, 
but men they start threatening – you choose the family or the boats…more than men, it is 
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the fisher women who are doing the campaign.” As Truelove (2011, 2018) notes, the 
intelligibility of infrastructural effects are produced through inequalities associated with 
processes of gender, class and social demarcations, with fissures for familial and 
community life becoming apparent even in protest movements (see also Scott 1998).  The 
top-down, debt-fuelled and unattainable character of Port City then was not only robbing 
the country of its sovereignty and breeding corruption but was also accentuating socio-
economic divides and causing community and familial tensions. The derangement had 
multiple strands needing further scrutiny. 
 
Derangement via ‘overdevelopment’ 
 
The geostrategic significance of Port City was highlighted at the official launch of the 
construction phase in 2015, attended by then president Mahinda Rajapaksa and Chinese 
Premier Xi Jinping. The close bilateral ties reflect historically amicable relations between 
Sri Lanka and China, cultivated from the 1950s through participation in the Bandung 
conference and Non-Aligned Movement (de Alwis 2010; see also Lin et al. 2018). This 
relationship can also be understood as a strategic geopolitical alliance to guard against 
India’s power as the regional hegemon in South Asia, aligning with the OBOR initiative as 
part of a new axis of power in the South Asia region (de Alwis 2010; Duara 2015; Lin et 
al. 2018).  
While China has emerged as an important foreign creditor in the post-war 
landscape, as de Alwis (2010) and Rajasingham-Senanayake (2018) note Sri Lanka’s 
indebtedness, bail-outs and corruption extends to both Western and Chinese lenders 
alike.  From multiple vantage points – as environmental activist, investors, bureaucrats, 
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or citizens – numerous segments of society figures articulated their fears about a 
prospective debt trap in the making, relaying their concern at the burden of debt-fuelled 
development.  A senior executive of one property firm described the situation as follows: 
 
"Out of our GDP, we are spending 80 or so percent of it on debt repayments. So, 
there is no chance…we are in a debt-trap, and we are specifically in a debt-trap 
because of ….a couple of big projects like that…"  
 
Environmental campaigners often responded in a similar fashion, whilst seeking to 
foreground the implications that this might have on democracy and global governance: 
 
"We are in a serious debt trap. Politically we are in a very handicapped situation, 
because we are under Chinese debt, and we have to follow what they say, and that 
will be a real problem for us, politically, in the future...." 
 
This was not always painted in such a negative light.  Another business figure, from a 
major Sri Lankan conglomerate, presented the case that this was part-and-parcel of lifting 
the country out of poverty: "We are very poor, as you know. We are paying our debts, by 
getting this Port City done. It's a huge thing." Nevertheless, the debt package offered by 
China and international creditors, and the terms of repayment stipulated, have generated 
significant anger over ‘handicapped sovereignty’, allude to the soft power exercised by 
China, and the ramifications of the debtor-creditor relationship to the West and China (de 
Alwis 2010; Kadirgamar 2013; Duara 2010; Lin et al 2017). 
The rapid acceleration of capital-intensive mega-infrastructure projects, derided 
by some activists as ‘overdevelopment’ has triggered a national debt crisis, with foreign 
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creditors wielding significant power over the direction of policymaking.  The political 
vision bestowed by architects of Port City assures "better" lives for Colombo’s residents 
in a generalised and abstract sense, with the project replicating a model of commerce and 
leisure catering only to elite and upper-middle class members of the population. There is, 
however, no acknowledgement of the mounting debt and its bearing on the people or 
those not endowed with sufficient cultural and economic capital to enjoy these new 
worlds (see also Sanyal 2007; de Alwis 2010; Gidwani and Baviskar 2011; Kadirgamar 
2013).  
The derangement of a debt burden is not the only gamble of Sri Lanka embracing 
the Port City. According to many of our interviewees, with this overdevelopment come 
incalculable environmental risks. The ecological impacts of sand mining – an undertaking 
necessary for the purposes of land reclamation - have been examined in scientific 
literature, revealing a plethora of risks.  To take one example, the cascading effects of 
mining on shoreline erosion increase vulnerability to storm surges due to a reduced 
absorptive capacity (Helmreich 2011, Torres et al 2015). A senior figure from the 
Environment Authority acknowledged environmental violations, but remained 
optimistic these could be overcome: 
 
The Chinese broke 47 [environmental] laws of our country. I took some legal guys 
from Sri Lanka to visit a few port cities last year – Guangzhou, Shenzhen and 
Guangdong. They have actually addressed environmental concerns in those port 
cities [as it's their own land]… " 
 
Yet questions whether such laws are ‘fit for purpose’ miss a broader point; the limited 
focus on ‘legality’, which while significant, risked overlooking the broader picture. A 
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beleaguered statement from Catholic religious leaders active in the movement recalled 
how this had played out:  
 
According to the EIA report, they should do mining 10km away from the coast. But 
the fishermen were estimating that they were doing it much closer, 5 km or 4km 
from the coast. And for that, everybody rose up against sand mining. 
 
A fisherman showed us how the sandy beaches of Negombo are turning brown 
and black due to the dredging on the sea coast in closer proximity than that stipulated by 
the revised EIA study.  Similar stories were recounted to us by environmentalists on the 
beach area south of Colombo, Mount Lavinia, where erosion and discolouring of the beach 
are visible.  The fact that the environment has already taken a setback speaks to how 
technocratic instruments provide a legibility and rationale that displaces and neglects 
both immediate and potential environmental risks.   
However, it is not just the coastline that is under duress. Environmental activists 
and scientists also brought to our attention the quarrying of rock and stone in the interior 
of the country, which is also needed to build the Port City and reclaim the sea.  An activist 
scientist mentioned how consequently the water table in the interior of the country is 
depleting, with water shortages and unpublicized landslips taking place in the interior of 
Sri Lanka.  A NGO activist leading a women centred unit corroborated the increasing 
difficulties faced by women because of the impact on their livelihoods due to these 
environmental changes.  Because the difficulties faced by these women take place in the 
interior of country, they are very easily overlooked as disconnected from the ecological 
harm caused by the Port City (see also Chakrabarty 2014).  
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As environmental regulations and EIA’s are ignored, there is also wilful ignorance 
to the future prospects of rising seas, exposure to storms, tsunamis and extreme weather 
events.  Even the stark warnings from the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change seems to have little bearing on policymakers (IPCC 2018; see also 
Chakrabarty 2014).  The IPCC report points to the urgent need for a radical restructuring 
of the world economy to avert the existential risk to ‘several hundred million’ lives. Yet, 
Sri Lanka’s Port City project signifies the inability to significantly rethink around global 
development agendas, as road, port, and airport expansion continues apace across the 
world.  It is, as Ghosh (2017) reminds us, "a colonial vision of the world, in which 
proximity to the water represents power and security, mastery and conquest, has now 
been incorporated into the very foundations of middle-class patterns of living across the 
globe" (2017, 22; see also Chakrabarty 2014). This refusal to discard outmoded tools and 
categories in the wake of impending ecological crisis, is akin to the abdication of 
responsibility which Ghosh decries as nothing less than derangement. 
Whilst the effect of infrastructures is concealed and remain above/below the 
surface, and even seemingly disconnected from other geographical spaces, they become 
visible in moments of crisis, surfacing when their operation stops or is interrupted – and 
this is a categorical failure, an indictment of the material symbolic modes of organisation 
(Chakrabarty 2014).  Hence, although state bureaucracies, actors and engineers produce 
calculation design to cultivate the appearance of legibility in infrastructure projects, a 
sense of arbitrariness often prevails where both knowledge and ignorance are 
simultaneously produced (Truelove 2018; see also Scott 1998).  
The promise of the Port City as an environmentally friendly eco-city rings hollow. 
Designed from scratch, its construction invariably requires huge amount of energy and 
material resources and come at the expense of retrofitting and ‘greening’ existing urban 
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infrastructure. Yet, as experience from South Asia alone shows, invariably, paradoxically 
incurs a violation of existing environmental laws and regulations (Baviskar 2011; Dutta 
2012). By decentring Colombo-centric narratives of the urban commons, we have 
attempted to appreciate the extent of derangement by bringing into the radar the 
ecological stress created through the Port City to communities in far-away places. 
 
Conclusion 
Nearly a decade on from the bloody conclusion to Sri Lanka’s civil war, efforts to 
transcend the country’s violent past and reinvent a process of economic renewal have 
gained pace, with an attendant political ambition to rebuild and unify post-war Sri Lanka 
have remained captive to a narrowly conceived articulation of development. The pivot 
from the nation to the city has led to distinct efforts to cultivate an increasingly 
financialised model of ‘Asian capitalism’, in which connectivity and economic growth are 
celebrated as the salve that will temper ethnic tensions and ameliorate turbulent social 
and class inequalities. However, the push for expressways, ports and airports, and the 
economic model now embodied in the skeleton of Port City, are susceptible to a form of 
cognitive dissonance, in which the ecological damages incurred are viewed as temporary 
aberrations or inconveniences that can be overcome, rather than exposing flaws at the 
heart of this vision. Ambiguity over the meaning of sustainability has deterred 
substantive engagement in this arena, with the closely textured, entanglements of fisher 
and local peoples’ livelihoods, coastal and interior ecosystems erased and replaced by 
simplistic binaries.  
Together then, these moments can be read as an indictment of environmental 
governance in the Colombo metropolitan area. The very illegibility of infrastructures, and 
the manifest difficulties of surveying their complex effects in producing exclusion, 
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environmental degradation and iniquity, allows the state to disavow its own obligations. 
At such a conjecture, it becomes necessary to return to spatial dimensions of uneven 
development. In the quest to connect post-war Sri Lanka with regional trading 
infrastructures and cultivate ties with global capital, there is a simultaneous disconnect 
from the immediate needs of local populations, ethnic politics and urban and coastal 
ecosystems. Such pauses, interruptions and disjunctures speak to incoherence, 
uncertainty, and unsettled forms of power that have constituted the infrastructural focus 
in post-war Sri Lanka.  More than this, infrastructure projects, have been a way of 
neglecting Sri Lanka’s fractured ethnic tensions, complex political past and uneven 
development – as the tragic events of April 2019 in Sri Lanka reveal.  Moreover, at this 
juncture with environmental risks deliberately ignored, neglected or displaced by 
proponents, which may likely tragically haunt Sri Lanka again in the future, as Bishop 
Asiri and the PMAPC warns.  
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Screen shot from the Port City Colombo promotional video. 
































Map of national infrastructure plan detailing new infrastructure projects 

























































The image was taken in July 2018 when the PMAPC protest was taking place.  The kite says “NO 
(to) Port City” in Sinhala; one of the three languages of Sri Lanka (other kites carried this message 
in Tamil and English as well). 
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